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TRACTABLE VALUATIONS UNDER
UNCERTAINTY
József Sákovicsy
The University of Edinburgh
November 4, 2014
Abstract
I put forward a concise and intuitive formula for the calculation
of the valuation for a good in the presence of the expectation that
further, related, goods will soon become available. This valuation is
tractable in the sense that it does not require the explicit resolution
of the consumers life-time problem.
JEL classication: D01, D03, D11, D91.
Keywords: distributed choice, quasi-linear utility, value for money.
1 Introduction
The literature on price determination generally treats an agents valuation of
an indivisible object as an exogenous parameter. But where does this value
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come from? Let us make the brave assumption that the agent knows by how
much his utility would increase relative to any given status quo in case he
obtained the object. The question remains: How would a boundedly rational
agent incorporate into his valuation the positive or negative  synergies
with other goods, which he might obtain later but consumes together with
the object? We resolve that question in this note.
Consider the following scenario: our agent is about to participate in a
trading mechanism where he can possibly obtain good A. The di¢ culty he
faces is that there exists a good1 B, which will become available later2 and
is not want independent of A: the utility derived from owning A depends
on whether or not the agent will own B as well. Of course, the ideal way
to resolve this problem would be to make a joint decision on the purchase
of A and B. However, it is often the case that this is not possible: at the
time of the opportunity to buy A it may well be that the price (or even the
availability) of B is not yet known to the agent, and as a result he cannot
predict with certainty whether he will end up owning B.
Of course, an  impractical alternative would be to solve the agents
entire stochastic life-time problem. Barring that, surprisingly, a tractable
solution to this basic problem is not known within the standard context of
consumer choice. The reason for that is the straight jacket imposed on us
by the universally accepted view of the consumer problem (due to Hicks and
Allen, 1934), which frames it as utility maximization subject to a budget
constraint: even if  and this is a big if  our agent knew his budget for
buying A and B; he would only be able to satisfy his budget constraint in
1To simplify the equations, we consider a single alternative good. The generalization
to many di¤erent potential baskets is straightforward.
2For simplicity, we do not model uncertainty over the time when B becomes available,
and also assume no discounting.
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expectation, which would generically lead to an ex post suboptimal decision.3
Recently, Friedman and Sákovics (2014) developed an alternative model of
tractable consumer choice.4 It is based on the Marshallian concept of themar-
ginal utility of money, , dened as the slope of the life-time indirect utility
function evaluated at the current wealth (and forgoing the current shopping
opportunity). According to them, the pecuniary connection between current
and future choices is a trade-o¤ rather than a (budget) constraint, and  
that can be learned and/or approximated is the measure of it. Crucially,
 need not be updated in between a series of small purchases. Thus, instead
of framing the consumers problem as maxu(x) subject to p  x  m; they
advocate maxu(x)   p  x: A nice thing about the resulting quasi-linear
utility is that it is well suited to handle a probabilistic problem as above.
Before turning to the model with multiple goods, it is worthwhile to pon-
der the implications of the quasi-linear foundation of valuation for a single
item. Recall that the valuation v of an object A is typically dened implicitly
by u(A;m  v) = u(0;m); where m is the money holding and we ignore the
additional arguments in the (not fully specied) utility function u. By con-
trast, from the quasi-linear approach it is immediate that the explicit value
is v = (u(A)  u(0))=: Also the utility function becomes clearly understood
as the utility derived from the basket of goods considered together with A;
which are want independent from any other goods: dening a subproblem
for which  can be considered constant.
The above decomposition of v into a utility factor, u(A)   u(0), and a
value of money factor, , has useful consequences. For example, we can
endogenize v without requiring the consumer to change her taste (u(:)). In
3See Sákovics (2011) for a model where the budget constraint is satisedfor a mis-
perceived, and therefore incorrect, (but xed) price, also leading to an ex post under- or
overspend.
4For the corresponding theory of revealed preference see Sákovics (2013).
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other words, we can make willingness to pay dependent on the circumstances
such as reference prices maintaining the objects utility value, and hence
the agents welfare, unchanged. Previously, in order to introduce welfare
neutral distortions, researchers needed to resort to an as ifapproach, where
it was counterfactually assumed that it was the perception of prices that was
distorted.5 Using the demand function developed by Friedman and Sákovics
(2014), all we need is a discrete change in  to achieve the same behavior
without interfering with welfare.
2 The main result and its derivation
Let u(A;B) denote the (incremental) utility of obtaining both A and B,
u(A;B) the utility of obtaining A but not B; etc. Let the price of good X
be denoted by pX : Also let FB(:) denote the cumulative distribution function
of the agents belief about the price of B. Finally, assume that the mar-
ginal utility of money in the continuation following the decisions over A and
B, ; is approximately constant within the range of prices considered.6 In
sum, u(:; :); pA; FB(:) and  are the only exogenous parameters of the agents
decision problem.
Denote by (BjA) the probability the agent assigns to buying B if he
also purchases A and by (BjA) if he does not. Also, write the expected
price of B; conditional on buying both it and A, as E(pBjB;A): Then using
the quasi-linear set-up of Friedman and Sákovics (2014) described above 
5See Sákovics (2011).
6In other words, the decisions are over small/inexpensive items. To model decisions
over a wider range of prices we could not maintain the quasi-linear approximation and
would need to work with a range of s.
4
we can write the agents expected utility if he buys A for pA as
(BjA) (u(A;B)  (pA + E(pBjB;A)) + (BjA)
 
u(A;B)  pA

:
Similarly, his expected utility in case he renounces to buy A normalizing
u(A;B) to zero is
(BjA)  u(A;B)  E(pBjB;A) :
By denition, the agents valuation for A; vA; is the price of A at which he
is indi¤erent between the two expected values:
vA =
(BjA)u(A;B) + (BjA)u(A;B)  (BjA)u(A;B)

+
(BjA)E(pBjB;A)  (BjA)E(pBjB;A):
Next, note that the agent will eventually purchase B if his direct gain in
utility evaluated at that point in time exceeds the shadow utility value of
the monetary cost: u(:; B) u(:; B)  pB:We can thus write the conditional
valuations for B as u(A;B) u(A;B)

= vAB and
u(A;B)

= vAB:
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We are now ready express the conditional purchasing probabilities as func-
tions of the exogenous parameters: (BjA) = FB
 
vAB

; (BjA) = 1 FB(vAB)
and (BjA) = FB(vAB): Finally, E(pBjB;A) =
R vAB
0 zdFB(z)
FB(v
A
B)
and E(pBjB;A) =R vAB
0 zdFB(z)
FB(v
A
B)
: Pulling everything together, we have
vA =
u(A;B)

+ FB(v
A
B)v
A
B   FB(vAB)vAB +
Z vAB
vAB
zdFB(z): (1)
Note that the last three terms of (1) can be interpreted as the result of
integration by parts. Reverse integratingthem we obtain our main result:
7Note that if A and B were want independent then vAB would equal v
A
B :
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Proposition 1. The valuation for good A before the agent learns the price
of good B is given by
vA =
u(A;B)

+
Z vAB
vAB
FB(z)dz: (2)
The rst term is the straightforward valuation that the agent would have
if he knew that good B was not available (or if A and B were want inde-
pendent). The second term captures the interdependence between A and B.
For example, if A and B are complements, then vAB > v
A
B (the utility gained
by obtaining B is greater if the agent also owns A) and the second term is
positive unless B is priced out of the agents reach: FB(vAB) = FB(v
A
B) = 0:
That is, if it is possible that a complementary good becomes available in
the (near) future, the valuation of the currently considered good increases.
Naturally, we have the opposite result for substitutes.
The size of the additional e¤ect depends on the distribution of pB: The
more likely it is that pB is low say, in terms of rst-order stochastic dom-
inance of the distribution functions  the more likely it is that B will be
bought and the more it a¤ects the valuation for A: In the extreme case,
when the agent is certain that he will buy good B, FB(vAB) = FB(v
A
B) = 1
and the second term becomes vAB   vAB = u(A;B) u(A;B) u(A;B) . Substituting
back into (2), we obtain vA =
u(A;B) u(A;B)

; as we should.
There are two possible interpretations of the Proposition. One is that
we have identied the error term, in case the agent or the modeler(!) 
mistakenly treats the purchase of A as a separable in terms of want inde-
pendence subproblem. In such a case the second term in (2) is missed out.
The other side of the same coin is to see that when the purchase of A is not
a separable subproblem, a virtual income e¤ectcomes into play even with
quasi-linear utilities.
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3 Conclusion
In this note we have derived the valuation for a good at a time when the
conditions under which another, related, good will be available are not yet
known. The su¢ cient statistic for the rest-of-life problem was the marginal
utility for money, which can be learned and/or estimated. This result can
be interpreted as a tractable micro-foundation for using a valuation as a
parameter in these circumstances.
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